Ricci solitons in three-dimensional paracontact geometry

We completely describe paracontact metric three-manifolds whose Reeb vector field satisfies the Ricci soliton equation. While contact Riemannian (or Lorentz\-ian) Ricci solitons are necessarily trivial, that is, $K$-contact and Einstein, the paracontact metric case allows nontrivial examples. Both homogeneous and inhomogeneous nontrivial three-dimensional examples are explicitly described. Finally, we correct the main result of [AGAG-D-13-00189], concerning three-dimensional normal paracontact Ricci solitons.Comment: 16 page

How do airlines preferences about engines influence the competition in the commercial aircraft industry: an empirical analysis

This paper examines the competitive context in the commercial aircraft industry. In particular, the aim of the research here presented is to understand what are the main drivers influencing the choice of a specific engine manufacturer in an aircraft, and how such preferences influence the competition between Airbus and Boeing. In order to do that, we have collected data about the fleet composition of the top 25 airlines and we have located the main drivers influencing the engine configuration in: route specialization, business model and maintenance policy. Implications of such empirical findings in the competition among aircraft manufacturers are finally discussed

Cooperation among competitors: A comparison of cost-sharing mechanisms

In this paper, we investigate the consequences of using outcome-based versus ex ante-based cost-sharing mechanisms in terms of competing firms' profitability and total welfare. We consider two firms making a joint expenditure, which can positively affect firms' demand and/or unit operating costs, while competing in the final market by setting either price or quantity. We compare two outcome-based cost-sharing mechanisms, i.e., Quantity Proportional (QP) and Total Margin proportional (TM), with the more competitive Fixed Share (FS) mechanism where cost-sharing is set up on an ex ante basis. We show that outcome-based mechanisms, and even a fully collusive behavior induced by the optimal cost-sharing mechanism, might actually enhance total welfare as compared with the more competitive FS mechanism. We also find that, although the FS mechanism is never more preferable than the TM mechanism, it can lead to higher profits than the QP mechanism when competition is mild. These results can support firms cooperating with competitors in the choice of the cost-sharing mechanism as well as provide important implications to policy makers

How firms are using networking decisions to achieve strategic objectives: Building theories from four case studies

Many research studies in OM literature have investigated how different kinds of focal firm decisions regarding business vertical relationships (i.e. with both suppliers and buyers) can positively affect firm’s operations performance and thus improve its competitive position. In this paper we extend this genre of study by also considering business horizontal relationships (i.e with competitors and firms that own complementary capabilities) and by considering the impact of business relationships not only on focal firm’s operations performance but also on its resources endowment. We present four cases that describe what are the strategic manager intents (in term of operations performance and resource endowment) when make decisions about both vertical and horizontal business relationships (i.e. networking strategy). Using theory building through case studies, we identify four archetypes of networking strategy. Each type of networking strategy is a unique configuration of the set of networking decisions adopted and the set of strategic objectives pursued

External knowledge sourcing for R&D activities: antecedents and implications of governance mode choice

This paper investigates how internal and external factors affect the choice between alliances and joint ventures (A&JVs) and mergers and acquisitions (M&As) for the external sourcing of research and development (R&D) activities, and whether or not such a choice is really con- tingent, that is, is it the best choice in terms of its impact on firms’ innovative performance under those circumstances? We build a set of hypotheses based on both the transaction-cost theory and the resource-based view, and test them through a secondary data source analy- sis. We found that companies adopt either R&D M&A or A&JV depending on internal (e.g. resources and capabilities, innovation experience) and external (e.g. degree of industry spe- cialisation) factors. Surprisingly, this contingent choice turns to be effective on innovative performance only for the internal factors, rather than the external. This paper contributes to inter-firm relationships literature by presenting the real advantages of using integrated and contingency theoretical models to understand contingent decisions

The role of the distribution platform in price formation of paid apps

In this paper we study the role of the distribution platform as an important determinant of price of paid apps. We also examine how the distribution platform influences the price implications of important developers' app-level decisions. To these purposes, we construct a hierarchical model of price formation by using an ad-hoc panel dataset consisting of top paid apps from the two major app stores, namely Apple's App Store and Google Play. Our findings show that prices of paid apps strongly depend on the platform where the apps are marketed. Specifically, the App Store is associated with lower prices for paid apps than Google Play. We find evidence that this is because the impact of cross-store differences in developer competition prevails over the impact of cross-store differences in average consumer willingness to pay. We also find that the price premiums as a return to trialability are more likely to emerge in Google Play than in the App Store, and that developers are more likely to adopt a penetration price policy in Google Play, thus implying an influence of the distribution platform on the price implications of these app-level decisions. Finally, our evidence does not confirm the argument that a more marked price reduction for paid apps embedding ads or generating revenues from other interested third parties should be observed in Google Play

Networking strategy for competitive advantage

This paper explores the potential of networking strategy as a source of competitive advantage by integrating market- based and resource-based logics. It contributes to operations management literature by considering not just supply chain structures but also others kinds of network that can emerge from horizontal agreements (i.e. alliances, partnerships, joint ventures, etc.). The paper reviews the literature and develops propositions regarding how make/buy/make together decisions, governance mechanisms and network-base structures allow firms both to pursue operations performance objectives and obtain/create valuable resources. A case study supports the propositions and shows a practical application of the presented research framework

Business agreements objectives and decisions: a field research

Purpose - Many research studies in operations management (OM) and strategic management (SM) investigate how different kinds of firm decisions regarding business relationships can positively affect firm’s operations performance, resources endowment, and competitive position. Very few studies exist, however, trying to illuminate the actual behavior of managers when making strategic decisions about their company relationships with other companies, as opposed to normative theory. The purpose of this paper is to explore linkages between the “set” of strategic objectives that managers are willing to pursue, the “set” of networking decisions they make, and the “set” of business agreements they sign. Design/methodology/approach – In order to investigate and explore actual manager behaviours about networking strategy, we adopt multiple-case study-based field research. We collect data on 13 business agreements from 3 manufacturing firms in the mechatronic industry in Italy. Within-case and cross-case analyses are mainly used for theory building purposes. Findings – Empirical data allow us to identify four different archetypes of networking strategy. The archetypes capture different connections between “set” of strategic objectives that managers are willing to pursue, “set” of networking decisions that they consider, and “set” of strategic agreements that they actually adopt. Specifically, the identified archetypes are named Multi-alignment, Multi-agreement (Diversification), Multi-objective, and Mono-alignment (Focus) and are related to different association multiplicities among objectives, decisions, and agreements. The implications related to these archetypes are three-fold. First, the Multi-alignment archetype suggests to focus not just on one kind of agreement but on the firm overall portfolio of agreements to understand how different kinds of agreements and networking decisions can play a complementary role in achieving firm’s pre-fixed business objective/s. Second, the Multi-agreement archetype suggests that managers can minimize the risk of loosing the potentiality of networking collaboration by undertaking different kinds of agreements for the same strategic objective. Third, the Mono-alignment (Focus) and Multi-objective archetypes suggest that also just one agreement can potentially pursues one or multiple strategic objectives and thus can allow managers to minimize the cost of managing several networking relationships. Originality/value – The originality of this study consists in exploring linkages between objectives, decisions and networking agreements without specifically focusing on: 1) either vertical or horizontal relationships as, contrarily and respectively, most of the OM and SM papers on business relationships usually do, 2) either operations performance (positioning school) or resource endowment (resource based view school) strategic objectives as, contrarily, most of the OM and SM papers on strategic alignment usually do; 3) any specific kind of agreement contract (outsourcing, alliance, joint venture, etc.) as usually most of the OM and SM papers usually do. This paper comes up with four different networking strategy archetypes that represent different way of matching “set” of networking decisions, strategic objectives and business agreements. They are not related to either vertical or horizontal relationships, either operations performance or resource endowment objectives, and to any contract agreement specific form